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CAN A STATE SEIZE AN INTERNET GAMBLING
WEBSITE’S DOMAIN NAME? AN ANALYSIS
OF THE KENTUCKY CASE
Kirk D. Homeyer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Chris Moneymaker, an accountant turned professional poker player, won
his seat at the 2003 World Series of Poker (“WSOP”) by winning a thirty-nine
dollar buy-in satellite tournament hosted by pokerstars.com.1  Playing at the
WSOP main event tournament, Moneymaker eliminated 1987 and 1988 WSOP
champion, Johnny Chan, and winner of seven WSOP bracelets, Phil Ivey.2
Wearing a pokerstars.com shirt and hat, Chris Moneymaker made it to the final
table of the tournament hosted at the renowned Binion’s Horseshoe in Las
Vegas, where he played against notable professional poker players Jason
“Jaky” Lester, Ihsan “Sammy” Farha, and the 1995 WSOP champion, Dan
Harrington.3
Moneymaker started the final table as the chip leader with $2.3 million in
chips, nearly $1 million ahead of the next nearest competitor, Amir Vahedi.4
After playing at the final table for over eleven straight hours, Moneymaker
eliminated Dan Harrington to go “heads up” with Sammy Farha.5  Just forty
minutes later, Chris Moneymaker beat Sammy Farha’s two pair with a full
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1 Team PokerStars: Chris Moneymaker, POKERSTARS.COM, http://www.pokerstars.com/
team-pokerstars/chris-moneymaker/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
2 The 2003 World Series of Poker Final Table, TEXASHOLDEM-POKER.COM, http://www.
texasholdem-poker.com/wsop03 (last visited Aug. 16, 2010); Chris Moneymaker eliminates
Phil Ivey out of the 2003 WSOP, PRO-POKER-BLOG.COM, http://pro-poker-blog.com/846/
chris-moneymaker-eliminates-phil-ivey-out-of-the-2003-wsop/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2010);
Phil Ivey Wins Second 2009 WSOP Bracelet For An Overall Total of Seven, LASVEGAS
VEGAS.COM, http://www.lasvegasvegas.com/content/phil-ivey-wins-second-2009-wsop-
bracelet-overall-total-seven (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
3 Id.; Nolan Dalla, Poker Tournament Gallery: Binion’s Horseshoe Presents The 2003
World Series of Poker Championship Event “The Final Table”, POKERPAGES.COM, http://
www.pokerpages.com/pokerinfo/tournamentgallery/wsop/gallery2003-finaltable.htm.  (last
visited Aug. 16, 2010).
4 Dalla, supra note 3.
5 Poker Info: WSOP 2003 Final Table Transcript of the Final 9 Players, POKERPAGES.COM,
http://www.pokerpages.com/pokerinfo/tournamentgallery/wsop/wsop-transcript-2003.htm.
(last visited Aug. 16, 2010).
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house, fives over fours, and became the 2003 WSOP champion, winning the
highly sought tournament bracelet and $2.5 million in cash.6
Chris Moneymaker earned his entry seat at the 2003 WSOP the modern
way: gambling online.  The following year, Greg “Fossilman” Raymer, the
2004 WSOP champion, also won his seat at the tournament by winning a satel-
lite tournament on pokerstars.com.7  Moneymaker’s run revolutionized the
game of poker by taking a game played only by professionals and opening the
poker-playing field to the accountant next door.  Now poker players and fans
attempt to replicate Moneymaker’s reign by starting at the seat in front of their
computers.
The newly developed Internet gambling forum has produced myriad legal
issues affecting state, federal, and international law.  The difficulty in address-
ing the issues arises from the ubiquity of the Internet.  Based on an analysis of
the Kentucky Case,8 this Note argues that a state cannot seize an Internet gam-
bling website’s domain name for violating that state’s laws.  First, Kentucky
did not have personal jurisdiction over the gambling domain names’ registrars
to have authority to seize them.  Second, Kentucky’s gambling statute violates
the Commerce Clause.9  Part II provides background to and the facts underly-
ing the Kentucky Case and its procedural posture.  Part III discusses legisla-
tion—both federal legislation and Kentucky’s statute—affecting Internet
gambling.  Part IV addresses the critical jurisdictional and constitutional issues
that arise when a state attempts to seize domain names.  Finally, Part V articu-
lates the rationale behind this Note’s argument that a state cannot seize an
Internet gambling website’s domain name for violating a state law.
A. A Brief History of Online Gambling
In 1931, Nevada was the first state that legalized gambling to capitalize on
the tourism boom expected after the completion of the Hoover Dam.10  In addi-
tion, legalization was an effort to gain control and regulate the already flourish-
6 Id.; POKERSTARS.COM, supra note 1.
7 Toby Bochan, Greg Raymer, ABOUT.COM, http://poker.about.com/od/playerprofiles/p/greg
raymer.htm. (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
8 Order of Seizure of Domain Names, Kentucky v. 141 Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409
(Franklin Cir. Ct., Div. II, Entered Sept. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Kentucky Case District Court
Order]; Opinion and Order, Kentucky v. 141 Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409, (Franklin
Cir. Ct., Div. II, Entered Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Kentucky Case District Court Opinion];
Order Granting Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Interactive Media Entertainment and Gam-
ing Association, Inc. v. Wingate, No. 2008-CA-002000-OA, (Ky. Ct. App., Entered Jan. 20,
2009) [hereinafter Kentucky Case Appeal Order]; Kentucky v. Interactive Media Entm’t and
Gaming Ass’n, Inc., et al., 306 S.W.3d 32 (Ky. 2010) [hereinafter Kentucky Case Supreme
Court Opinion].
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  There is another legal issue that has yet to be addressed,
regarding whether a state can order Internet Service Providers (ISPs) located in its state to
prohibit access of its residents to gambling sites.  News Release, Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
Minnesota Notifies Telecoms to Prohibit Access Between Residents and Gambling Sites
(Apr. 29, 2009), available at www.dps.state.mn.us/comm/press/nePRSystem/viewPR.asp?
PR_Num=879.  This note does not address that issue.
10 ROGER DUNSTAN, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CRB-97-003, GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA 6
(1997), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/97/03/chapt2.html.
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ing illegal gambling market.11  Nevada’s legalization of gambling influenced
other states over time to legalize at least some forms of gambling.  Today,
gambling is legal in forty-eight states.12
The first online gambling site was started in August 1995,13 and the first
online poker site launched in 1998.14  However, it was not until 2003 that
online gambling, especially online poker, became mainstream as a result of the
World Poker Tour debuting on the Travel Channel and ESPN televising the
2003 WSOP main event final table.15  These new gambling websites popular-
ized online gambling by teaching users how to play, often for free.16  Further-
more, stories like Chris Moneymaker’s motivate amateur players to gamble
online in hopes of winning big and potentially achieving professional and
celebrity status.17
The American Gaming Association estimates that there are currently well
over 2,000 Internet gambling websites that offer various gambling activities
ranging from sports betting to casino games.18  In 2005, “fifteen to twenty mil-
lion Americans placed bets online [and] the U.S. online gambling market was
estimated at $6 billion.”19  In 2008, Internet gambling revenue for offshore
companies was approximately $5.9 billion attributed to American gamblers and
$21 billion for gamblers worldwide.20  “Estimates show that seventy percent of
all online wagers are U.S.-based,” with Americans accounting “for over eighty
percent of online poker players and participating in more than fifty five percent
of online gambling activities.”21  Internet gambling is predicted to gross
approximately $25 billion a year by 2010.22
The components of an Internet gambling website are relatively simple.
Unlike a casino that requires a casino floor, tables, dealers, actual playing
cards, dice, roulette wheels, hotel rooms, and other forms of entertainment for
its guests, an Internet gambling website requires only a few things before it can
11 Id.
12 Hawaii and Utah are the only states that ban all forms of gambling.  Scott Olson, Betting
No End to Internet Gambling, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2 para. 1 (1999).
13 AM. GAMING ASS’N, Internet Gambling, Fact Sheet, (2003), http://www.americangaming.
org/Industry/factsheets/issues_detail.cfv?id=17.
14 Online Poker Industry – A Brief History, Learning Poker & About FTR, ONLINE POKER,
http://www.online-poker.flopturnriver.com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2010).
15 Id.
16 Lisa Boikess, Note, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006: The Pit-
falls of Prohibition, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 156 (2008) (citing Alan
Schmadtke, Are All Bets Off-Line?  New Law Makes It Riskier to Wager on the Web,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (FINAL ED.), Nov. 12, 2006, at C9).
17 Id. (citations omitted).
18 AM. GAMING ASS’N, supra note 13.
19 Gerd Alexander, Note, The U.S. on Tilt: Why the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforce-
ment Act is a Bad Bet, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶ 1 (2008), http://www.law.duke.edu/
journals/dltr/articles/2008DLTR0006.html.
20 AM. GAMING ASS’N, supra note 13.
21 Legality, GAMBLINGPLANET.ORG, http://www.gamblingplanet.org/legality_main.php (last
visited Aug. 17, 2010).
22 I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS, JR., INTERNET GAMING LAW 393 (2d ed. 2009)
(citing estimate by Christiansen Capital Advisers available at http://www.cca-i.com/Primary
%20Navigation/Online%20Data%20Store/internet_gambling_data.htm (Oct. 24, 2007)).
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start taking bets.23  First, the website needs to register a domain name.  The
website must register the domain name from a registrar, an accredited company
that has the authority to register domain names to other companies or individu-
als that would like to own a particular website address.24  At that time, the new
website owner becomes the registrant and has the rights to the domain name.25
(The distinction between a domain name owner and a domain name registrar is
crucial to the analysis of the Kentucky Case.)  Accordingly, a domain name
owner operates the website, whereas the registrar simply sells the rights to the
domain name to the respective domain name owner.
A domain name is a name that uniquely identifies a website on the
Internet.26  Addresses to websites on the Internet are actually numeric IP
addresses, so a domain name acts as a user-friendly substitute for IP
addresses.27  An IP address “is a code made up of numbers separated by three
dots that identifies a particular computer on the Internet.  Every computer,
whether it be a Web server or the computer [you are] using right now, requires
an IP address to connect to the Internet.”28
Second, a gambling website requires a server.  A server is a computer that
stores all of the files necessary to display a website’s pages and delivers the
information to computers accessing the domain name.29  The more games
played and the more players playing, the more server space required.  Through
either a larger server or multiple servers clustered together, a gambling website
will be able to host more tables, more players, and more games; thus, making
more money.
Third, a gambling website requires specific software.  A website can either
license software from third-party developers,30 or the website owners can write
the code themselves.  The gambling user then interacts with this software to
place his bets.  The software is responsible for the layout, interface, and graphic
design.31  Variability in the code and software explains why gambling websites
do not necessarily operate and look the same.
23 Charlie Dickstein provided the general information on the following description and pro-
cess of how to establish an Internet gambling website.
24 Domain Name Registrar, WEBOPEDIA.COM, http://www.webopedia.com/term/d/domain_
name_registrar.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2010); Domain Name Registrar, BUSINESSDIC-
TIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/domain-name-registrar.html
(last visited Aug. 17, 2010).  Domain name registrars include GoDaddy.com, networksolu-
tions.com, eNom.com, Register.com, moniker.com, inter alia.
25 Domain Name Registrant, WEBOPEDIA.COM, http://www.webopedia.com/term/d/domain_
name_registrant.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
26 Domain Name Definition, THE LINUX INFO. PROJECT, http://www.linfo.org/domain_
name.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
27 Id.
28 IP Address, TECHTERMS.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/ipaddress (last vis-
ited Aug. 18, 2010).
29 How Web Servers Work, WEBOPEDIA.COM, http://www.webopedia.com/didyouknow/
Internet/2003/howwebserverswork.asp (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
30 Online gambling software developers include playtech, Microgaming, Proprietary
Software, Cryptologic, and PartyGaming.  For a more in depth list of gambling software
developers, see Online Casino Software Providers, GAMBLINGPLANET.ORG, http://www.
gamblingplanet.org/casino_software.php (last visited Aug. 18, 2010).
31 Charlie Dickstein provided the general information how to establish and set up an
Internet gambling website.
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Finally, a gambling website requires gamblers to have computers with
Internet access.  Without ever having to enter an actual casino, gamblers can
place their bets and make their bluffs from their own home.  Placing a bet is as
easy as making a purchase online.  Generally, the gambling user must register
and create an account with the website.32  Then, the user deposits money—by
credit card, wire transfer, mailing a check or money order, or transferring
though a third-party payor such as Paypal—into an account specifically set
up to be used to make bets at the gambling website.33  The user is then able to
start making bets simply by logging into his account via the Internet.  If the
user wins, his account is credited, and the proceeds can be returned to the bettor
by the same means that the user deposited money with the gambling website.34
II. THE KENTUCKY CASE
Gambling, particularly horse-racing, produces substantial income and is a
long-standing tradition in Kentucky,35 with Kentuckians spending an estimated
$170 million on gambling annually.36  As a time-honored tradition and the
home of the renowned Kentucky Derby, the industry also provides a significant
number of Kentucky’s jobs.37  Therefore, Internet gambling poses a threat to
Kentucky’s prosperous gambling industry.
On September 18, 2008, the Commonwealth of Kentucky issued a Seizure
Order for the registrars of 141 domain names to forfeit the domain names to the
Commonwealth.38  The Order alleged that the domain names were being used
in violation of Kentucky law39 and gave Kentucky the right to seize control of
the 141 listed domain names.  Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear and the Pub-
lic Safety Cabinet brought the action in an effort to protect Kentucky’s taxable
gambling interests, mainly its horse racing establishments.40  In addition, the
action supported Governor Beshear’s heavy campaigning to bring casino gam-
bling to Kentucky by taxing gambling establishments to “increase overall state
revenue and provide enhanced services to some of the areas that need them
badly.”41  The Commonwealth claimed that the gambling websites operating in
Kentucky via the Internet “create[d] a tremendous disadvantage for [Ken-
tucky’s] legitimate, licensed[,] and taxed gaming interests[.]”42
32 Olson, supra note 12, para. 9.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Joel Hruska, Kentucky Seizes Two Gambling Domains, Sites Fight Back, ARS TECHNICA
(Oct. 9, 2008, 3:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/10/kentucky-seizes-two-
gambling-domains-sites-fight-back.ars.
36 Anthony Kammer, Kentucky Appeals Court Overturns Domain Name Seizure, JOLT
DIGEST (Jan. 25, 2009, 1:32 PM), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/internet/vicsbingocom-v-
kentucky.
37 Hruska, supra note 35.
38 Kentucky Case District Court Order, supra note 8, at 1.
39 Id.  For the pertinent text of the statute, see infra Part III.C.
40 Kammer, supra note 36.
41 Hruska, supra note 35.
42 Brian Krebs, Kentucky Tests State’s Reach Against Online Gambling, WASH. POST, (Oct.
8, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/08/AR200810080
2870.html.
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Before the Commonwealth issued the Seizure Order on September 18,
2008, the Franklin District Court, Division II, of the Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky held a hearing.43  The Commonwealth presented evidence that it had
assembled a team to ascertain whether Internet gambling was readily available
in Kentucky.44  After “500 man-hours on-line,” the Commonwealth presented
its evidence to the Court that Internet gambling was available in Kentucky.45
In addition, the Commonwealth provided an expert on cyber crime who opined
that “an Internet domain name is a device or transport device allowing Ken-
tuckians to engage in [I]nternet gambling.”46  On the basis of the Common-
wealth’s presentation at the hearing, the Court issued the September 18 Seizure
Order.47
The Seizure Order alleged that the domain names “were and are being
used in connection with illegal gambling activity” in violation of Kentucky
Revised Statutes (“KRS”) Chapter 528.48  The Seizure Order stated that the
registrars of the respective domain names shall immediately transfer the
domain names to an account of the Commonwealth.49  The Seizure Order
stated that seizure of the domain names in rem “constitute[d] notice to any
persons who claim an interest” in the seized property.50  Finally, the Seizure
Order mandated that any party claiming ownership of the domain names must
attend a hearing to determine whether the owner qualifies for return of the
property pursuant to the statute.51  If any owner failed to attend the hearing or
to establish that the domain name should be returned to the owner, the Com-
monwealth would dispose of the domain names.52  The 141 domain names sub-
ject to forfeiture were listed on Exhibit A of the Seizure Order.53
About a month later, on October 16, 2008, Judge Thomas D. Wingate of
the Franklin District Court, Division II, of the Commonwealth of Kentucky
rendered the Seizure Order valid.54  The Opinion’s main focus addressed the
pertinent issue of whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction or in rem
jurisdiction over a civil forfeiture action involving Internet domain names.55
The Court acknowledged that its power “over the claims of the Commonwealth
and over the . . . Domain Names is both constrained by and a function of” the
Court’s jurisdiction.56
The Court further held that “KRS Chapter 528 prohibits gambling” in
Kentucky.57  According to the Court, the domain names have been and are
43 Kentucky Case District Court Opinion, supra note 8, at 5.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 5-7.
46 Id. at 6.
47 Id. at 7.
48 Kentucky Case District Court Order, supra note 8, at 1.  For the pertinent text of the
statute, see infra Part III.C.
49 Kentucky Case District Court Order, supra note 8, at 2.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at Exhibit A.
54 Kentucky Case District Court Opinion, supra note 8, at 40.
55 See generally Kentucky Case District Court Opinion, supra note 8.
56 Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
57 Id. at 12.
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being used in connection with Internet gambling within Kentucky, and KRS
528.10058 “authorizes forfeiture actions of gambling devices.”59  Thus, the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the civil forfeiture claim.
Moreover, the Court rejected the proposition that domain names are not prop-
erty—just like telephone numbers are not property—holding that the domain
names are property and that the Court has in rem jurisdiction to hear the case.60
The Court found that the Internet gambling websites and “their property, the
Internet domain names, are present in Kentucky[ ]” as a result of their “continu-
ous and systematic” presence, authorizing the Court’s jurisdiction over the
case.61
Finally, the Order addressed the crucial question of whether the domain
names were “gambling devices” and thus subject to and in violation of KRS
Chapter 528.62  The Court declared that the “[d]omain [n]ames here were used
and are still being used in connection with Internet gambling transactions in
violation of the spirit of KRS Chapter 528 [and consequently] fall within the
meaning of a gambling device[.]”63  Therefore, the domain names were subject
to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to the statute and the Court’s jurisdiction.64
Judge Wingate’s Order amended the Seizure Order in only one way—by
allowing any of the 141 Domain Name defendants, within thirty days from
entry of the Order, to install “geographic blocking” software65 that would block
consumers within Kentucky from accessing the Gambling website.66  The geo-
graphic block would have to be satisfactory to the commonwealth or the
court.67  If these requirements were met, the court agreed to relinquish its juris-
diction over the domain name.68
Although Judge Wingate’s Order on October 16 targeted 141 domain
names, only six of the domain names targeted accepted the legal challenge and
appealed to the Common Wealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals.69  On appeal,
on January 20, 2009, the court of appeals of Kentucky held that the trial court
erred in concluding that the domain names were in violation of Kentucky law
and subject to forfeiture.70  The court of appeals struck down the district court’s
order and prohibited the lower court “from enforcing its order seizing the 141
domain names and from conducting a scheduled forfeiture hearing.”71
58 For the pertinent text of the statute, see infra Part III.C.
59 Kentucky Case District Court Opinion, supra note 8, at 12.
60 Id. at 12-15.
61 Id. at 22.
62 Id. at 22-25.
63 Id. at 25.
64 Id.
65 This Note does not address the issues regarding whether required “geographic blocking”
software is the less restrictive means to accomplish the Kentucky court’s goals.
66 Kentucky Case District Court Opinion, supra note 8, at 39.
67 Id. at 39-40.
68 Id. at 40.
69 Kentucky Case Appeal Order, supra note 8, at 1-2.  The domain names that appealed
were playersonly.com, sportsbook.com, sportsinteraction.com, mysportsbook.com, lines
maker.com, and vicsbingo.com. Id.; See generally Hruska, supra note 35.
70 Kentucky Case Appeals Order, supra note 8, at 8.
71 Id. at 3.
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The court of appeals’ reversal was based on its holding that domain names
do not fall within the statutory definition of KRS 528.010(4).72  The court of
appeals reasoned that “it stretches credulity to conclude that a [domain name]
can be said to constitute a ‘machine or any mechanical or other device . . .
designed and manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling.’”73
The court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in concluding that domain
names are gambling devices subject to forfeiture under KRS 528.100,74 adding
that since domain names are not considered “gambling devices” pursuant to
KRS 528.100, the lower court did not have jurisdiction over them.75
The court of appeals did not, however, address whether a domain name is
considered property and thus subject to in rem jurisdiction nor did it address
whether the domain names’ accessibility in Kentucky constituted sufficient
“presence” in the state to establish Kentucky’s jurisdiction over them.  Further-
more, it is important to note that neither the trial court nor the appellate court
addressed the sensitive issue of whether Kentucky law, when applied to seizure
of domain names or the Kentucky gambling statute itself, violated the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution.
On March 18, 2010, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the court of
appeals ruling.76  In an opinion by Justice Noble, the court held that many of
the arguments presented by the appellees in the court of appeals were “compel-
ling”77 and “may have merit.”78  However, the appellees lacked standing to
bring the appeal.  In order to have standing, the court requires that the party
must have a “judicially recognizable interest.”79  Regarding the domain names
themselves, according to the Court, “[t]he domain names are not their own
owners or registrants, nor do they claim to be.  Thus, [the Commonwealth]
lacked standing. . . .”80  Regarding the “gaming associations,” they claimed to
have an interest in the litigation under the doctrine of “associational stand-
ing.”81  However, because the associations failed to prove their associational
standing by identifying their seized members, they did not achieve associa-
tional standing.82
72 Id. at 8.
73 Id.
74 Id.  For the pertinent text of the statute, see infra Part III.C.
75 Kentucky Case Appeal Order, supra note 8, at 9.
76 Kentucky Case Supreme Court Opinion, 306 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Ky., 2010).
77 Id. at 35; Matt Zimmerman, Kentucky Supreme Court Reverses Ruling Challenging
Domain Name Seizures, Tells Registrants to Try Again, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 18,
2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/kentucky-supreme-court-reverses-domain-
name-ruling.
78 Kentucky Case Supreme Court Opinion, 360 S.W.3d at 35; Zimmerman, supra note 77.
79 Kentucky Case Supreme Court Opinion, 306 S.W.3d at 37 (citing Schroering v. McKin-
ney, 906 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Ky. 1995)).
80 Id.
81 Id.; See also Heidi Feldman, Note, Divided We Fall: Associational Standing and Collec-
tive Interest, 87 MICH. L. REV. 733, 733 (1988) (Standing will be accorded under the doc-
trine of associational standing if (1) some or all of the association’s members have suffered
individual injury, or (2) the association, likened to a single person, has suffered an injury
comparable to one to which an individual could be vulnerable).
82 Kentucky Case Supreme Court Opinion, 306 S.W.3d at 39.
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In essence, the Supreme Court of Kentucky eschewed the issue of whether
a state has the authority to seize an Internet gambling website’s domain name
from its respective registrar, leaving the case open for “future relief.”83
Instead, it only reversed the Court of Appeals and ruled that the trial court erred
in concluding the domain names were in violation of Kentucky law and subject
to forfeiture on the grounds that the appellees did not have standing.84  How-
ever, the Supreme Court explicitly noted that “[i]f a party that can properly
establish standing comes forward, the writ petition giving rise to these proceed-
ings could be re-filed with the Court of Appeals.”85
This Note addresses the jurisdictional and Commerce Clause issues raised
in the Kentucky courts’ orders and demonstrates that states do not have the
power to seize an Internet gambling website’s domain name.86
III. INTERNET GAMBLING LAWS
The federal government has consistently deferred to the states to regulate
gambling.87  Deference is embodied in the Illegal Gambling Business Act,
which provides that in order for gambling to be federally illegal, it first must be
illegal under the respective state’s laws.88  There are, however, a few federal
statutes that attempt to regulate gambling.
Federal statutes that regulate gambling include the Travel Act,89 Interstate
Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act,90 Interstate Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act,91 and the Organized Crime Control Act.92  All
of these statutes implicate Internet gambling;93 however, this Note only
addresses the two most pertinent federal Acts pertaining to whether a state can
seize a domain name: The Wire Act and the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act.
A. The Wire Act
As a part of U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s “War on
Crime,”94 Congress enacted the Interstate Wire Act of 1961 (“Wire Act”).95  It
is claimed to be the most relevant source of law affecting Internet gambling.96
The Wire Act provides that:
83 Id. at 34.
84 Id. at 40.
85 Id.; Zimmerman, supra note 77.
86 Another issued raised by the seizure of Internet Gambling website domain names is that
seizure violates the owners’ First Amendment rights.  This Note does not address that issue.
87 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(1) (2006); Olson, supra note 12, para. 3.
88 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i) (2006).
89 Id. § 1952 (2006).
90 Id. § 1953 (2006).
91 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006).
92 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006).
93 Michael P. Kailus, Note, Do Not Bet on Unilateral Prohibition of Internet Gambling to
Eliminate Cyber-Casinos, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045, 1057-58 (1999).
94 ROSE & OWENS, supra note 22, at 116.
95 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006).
96 See A. Gregory Gibbs, Note, Anchorage: Gaming Capital of the Pacific Rim, 17 ALASKA
L. REV. 343, 349 (2000).
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Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire
communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets
or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting
event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.97
In general, the Wire Act prohibits a person in the business of betting and
wagering from using telephone lines “interstate” to conduct bets and wagers.98
In order to be “engaged in the business of betting or wagering,” courts
require that the person be acting in a broker capacity charging a fee99 and must
do so on a continuous basis.100  Furthermore, Congress targeted the Wire Act at
halting the growth of interstate gambling syndicates,101 so the law does not
target the individual bettor or player.  Moreover, the statute only prohibits
wagering on “any sporting event or contest,” thus leaving Internet casino games
legal.  In fact, Congress has interpreted non-sports betting as being legal under
the Wire Act.102
The purpose of the Wire Act was to suppress organized gambling activi-
ties by “prohibiting the use of wire communication facilities which are or will
be used for the transmission of bets or wagers and gambling information in
interstate and foreign commerce.”103  Furthermore, the Wire Act was intended
to prohibit “the use of or the leasing, furnishing, or maintaining of wire com-
munication facilities which are or will be used for the transmission of certain
gambling information in interstate and foreign commerce.”104
As previously stated, the Wire Act only prohibits gambling on “any sport-
ing event or contest.”  The plain language shows Congress’ intent to exclude
other forms of gambling, including casino style games, in the Wire Act.105
Furthermore, the enactment of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(“OCCA”)106 demonstrates Congress’ intent that the Wire Act excludes all
other forms of gambling except sporting events.  The OCCA made it a crime to
“conduct[ ], finance[ ], manage[ ], supervise[ ], direct[ ], or own[ ] all or part of
an illegal gambling business . . .”107 clearly showing Congress’ intent for the
statute to cover all forms of gambling.  Because Congress did not specifically
97 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2006).
98 ANTHONY N. CABOT ET AL., FEDERAL GAMBLING LAW 115 (1999).
99 United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d on other grounds,
700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
100 United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 1979).
101 United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 358 (1957) (citing United States v. Kahriger,
345 U.S. 22, 27 n.3 (1953)).
102 S.B. 474, 105th Cong. (1997).
103 H.R. REP. NO. 87-967, at 2631 (1961).
104 Id. at 2633.
105 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006).
106 S.B. 30, 91st Cong., Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
107 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2006).  Gambling included “pool-selling, bookmaking, maintain-
ing slot machines, roulette wheels or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, Bolita or
number games, or selling chances therein.”
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address these other forms of gambling in the Wire Act, it is likely that Congress
did not intend the statute to cover all forms of gambling.
In In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., a federal district court addressed the legisla-
tive history of the Wire Act.108  The court acknowledged that the plain lan-
guage of the statute “clearly require[d] that . . . the gambling be a sporting
event or contest.”109  The court further noted that recently proposed amend-
ments to the Wire Act and additional Internet gambling statutes sought to
expand the Wire Act’s coverage to forms of gambling beyond sports-betting
thus including all forms of gambling.110  The court deemed “this as a Congres-
sional admission that the Wire Act was indeed limited in scope.”111
Because the Wire Act was “[p]assed well before the advent of the
Internet . . . the statutory language is grounded in the technologies of the time,
and the application of the Wire Act to Internet gambling is fraught with ambi-
guity.”112  One commentator argued that because Internet gambling takes place
in the “ethereal jurisdiction” of the Internet, it “may not involve a ‘wire com-
munication’ for the conveyance of bets.”113
B. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
On October 23, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (“UIGEA”).114  The
UIGEA was a last-minute attachment to the Safe Port Act.115  In fact, no one
on the Senate-House Conference Committee had even seen the final language
of the bill.116  Among the bill’s supporters were Representatives James Leach,
Peter King, John Boehner, and Senator Bill Frist.  In juxtaposition were lobby-
ing groups for casinos, horseracing tracks, state attorneys general, and religious
groups.117  Moreover, social conservatives that supported the passage of the
UIGEA posited that online gambling “compromises family values and exacer-
bates underage gambling and addiction by gamblers of all ages.”118
The UIGEA provides that:
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may knowingly accept, in
connection with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling
credit . . . electronic fund transfers . . . any check, draft or similar instrument . . . or
108 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. L.A. 2001), aff’d, 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
109 Id. at 480.
110 Id. at 480-81. See also Alexander, supra note 19, ¶ 14 (citing In re MasterCard Int’l,
132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 479-81 (E.D. La. 2001)).
111 Alexander, supra note 19, ¶ 14 (citing In re MasterCard Int’l, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 480-
81).
112 Gibbs, supra note 96, at 349.
113 Id. at 349-50 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-967, at 1 (1961)).
114 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006).
115 152 CONG. REC. H8026-04, H8036 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Lobiondo).
116 I. Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
Analyzed, 10 GAM. L. REV. 537, 537 (2006).
117 152 CONG. REC. H8026-04, H8029, H8037-H8038 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).  It is a rare
occasion that casino and horseracing track lobbyists support the same legislation as state
attorneys general and religious group lobbyists.
118 Boikess, supra note 16, at 176 (citing 152 CONG. REC. H8026-04, H8029 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 2006)).
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the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction which involves a financial
institution[.]119
In effect, the UIEGA bans American financial institutions from processing
the payments of domestic and overseas payment processors, thus targeting the
funding120 of Internet gambling.121  Like the Wire Act, the UIGEA does not
cover players, but rather seeks to prohibit Internet gambling through another
avenue: the financial system.
Although legislative history demonstrates congressional efforts to amend
the Wire Act to regulate Internet gambling,122 the UIGEA of 2006 neither
strengthens nor weakens the Wire Act.123  As opposed to targeting individual
gamblers, the Act regulates financial transactions and payment systems to cut
off the flow of funds to Internet gambling website accounts.124  Congress
attacked Internet gambling on the financial payment side in response to multi-
ple prior failures at regulating it conventionally.
The Act “eliminates the possibility of charging financial institutions and
computer hosts under a theory of aiding and abetting, since it explicitly
states . . . that being in the business of gambling does not include a ‘financial
transaction provider,’ or an ISP.”125  Under the same rationale, it is likely that
the Act eliminates the possibility of charging a domain name registrar for aid-
ing and abetting.
Notwithstanding the UIGEA, Professor I. Nelson Rose posits that “online
gambling should be regarded as perfectly legal.”126  Professor Rose reasons
that “no United States federal statute or regulation explicitly prohibits online
gambling, either domestically or abroad.”127
119 31 U.S.C. § 5363(1)-(4) (2006).  Section 5363 in its entirety states:
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may knowingly accept, in connection
with the participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling—
(1) credit, or the proceeds of credit, extended to or on behalf of such other person (includ-
ing credit extended through the use of a credit card);
(2) an electronic fund transfer, or funds transmitted by or through a money transmitting
business, or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or money transmitting service, from
or on behalf of such other person;
(3) any check, draft, or similar instrument which is drawn by or on behalf of such other
person and is drawn on or payable at or through any financial institution; or
(4) the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction, as the Secretary and the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may jointly prescribe by regulation, which
involves a financial institution as a payor or financial intermediary on behalf of or for the
benefit of such other person.
120 Id. Funding by way of personal credit cards, wire transfers, and payment system
instruments.
121 Boikess, supra note 16, at 171 (citations omitted).
122 See e.g., Internet Gambling Prohibition Act, H.R. 4777, 109th Cong. (2006).
123 Boikess, supra note 16, at 170-71.
124 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006).
125 Rose, supra note 116, at 539.
126 GAMBLINGPLANET.ORG, supra note 21.
127 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-1\NVG105.txt unknown Seq: 13 13-JUN-11 8:59
Spring 2011] INTERNET GAMBLING WEBSITE’S DOMAIN NAME 119
C. Kentucky Law on Gambling
Kentucky enacted its gambling laws in 1974.128  The gambling statute
used to seize the domain names in the Kentucky Case was KRS 528.100.129
The statute provides that:
Any gambling device or gambling record possessed or used in violation of this chap-
ter is forfeited to the state, and shall be disposed of in accordance with KRS 500.090,
except that the provisions of this section shall not apply to charitable gaming activity
defined by KRS 528.010(1).130
The statute defines “gambling device” as:
(a) Any so-called slot machine or any other machine or mechanical device an essen-
tial part of which is a drum or reel with insignia thereon, and which when operated
may deliver, as a result of the application of an element of chance, any money or
property, or by the operation of which a person may become entitled to receive, as
the result of the application of an element of chance, any money or property; or
(b) Any other machine or any mechanical or other device, including but not limited
to roulette wheels, gambling tables and similar devices, designed and manufactured
primarily for use in connection with gambling and which when operated may deliver,
as the result of the application of an element of chance, any money or property, or by
the operation of which a person may become entitled to receive, as the result of the
application of an element of chance, any money or property.131
The statute is unambiguous.  It is intended to cover physical, tangible
gambling devices that are “designed or manufactured,” such as slot machines or
gambling tables.  It does not include other types of nonphysical, intangible
property, such as domain names.
As previously explained, a domain name is a name that uniquely identifies
a website on the Internet that serves as a user-friendly substitute for an IP
address, the numeric address of a specific computer on the Internet.132  It is the
state legislature’s obligation, not the Kentucky courts’, to include domain
names within the definition of gambling devices if it wants the statute to cover
them.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF JURISDICTION AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
ON DOMAIN NAMES
This Note addresses whether Kentucky has the authority to seize a gam-
bling website’s domain name from two different angles.  First, this Note ana-
lyzes and concludes that Kentucky did not have personal jurisdiction over the
domain name registrars to even have authority to seize them.  Second, regard-
less of whether Kentucky had jurisdiction over the domain names, this Note
analyzes and determines that the Kentucky statute, on its face, is unconstitu-
tional as it violates the Commerce Clause.
128 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 528.100 (West 1980). See also Kentucky Case Appeal
Order, supra note 8, at 13.
129 Kentucky Case District Court Order, supra note 8, at 1.
130 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 528.100 (West 1980).
131 Id. § 528.010(4) (West 1994).
132 THE LINUX INFO. PROJECT, supra note 26.
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A. Kentucky Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Domain Name
Registrars
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution precludes a
state from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law.”133  A state violates the Due Process Clause if its courts enter
judgments against defendants over whom they did not have personal jurisdic-
tion.  Therefore, plaintiffs do not have the right to bring a suit wherever they
choose.
Within the last quarter of a century, the advent of the pervasive Internet
has posed new challenges to courts’ personal jurisdictional reach.  Not even the
Supreme Court has addressed the extent of a court’s jurisdiction over business
conducted and contacts made from and through the Internet.134  Thus, the dis-
trict courts have been left with the task of determining personal jurisdiction
over a defendant based on its Internet activity.135  Although the application of
personal jurisdiction will inevitably evolve as new technology progresses, it has
“remained clear that technology cannot eviscerate the constitutional limits on a
State’s power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.”136
The determination of whether a court has jurisdiction over a case or con-
troversy starts with the 1877 landmark Supreme Court case, Pennoyer v.
Neff.137  Justice Field articulated that a person must be physically present in a
state in order to be subject to that state court’s jurisdiction.138  Furthermore, the
Court held that in order for a judgment determining claims against a property to
be valid, the property must be physically present in the state.139  The require-
ment of physical presence in a state in order to have jurisdiction predates the
advent of advanced forms of transportation, technology, and a borderless
economy.
It is not surprising that the law governing jurisdiction has evolved since
1877.  In the seminal case, International Shoe Co. v. Washington,140 the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Pennoyer’s “presence” requirement can be satisfied if “minimum contacts”
are made with the state as long as the state’s jurisdiction does not offend “tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”141  Jurisdiction will depend
133 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
134 A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles
to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 73 (2006) (citing Gator
.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) and ALS Scan Inc. v.
Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2002)).
135 Compare Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451, 455 (3d Cir. 2003)
and ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 709 (4th Cir. 2002) with
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1997) and Zippo Mfg. Co. v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-26 (W.D. Pa. 1997) and Inset Sys. v. Instruc-
tion Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Conn. 1996).
136 ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 2002).
137 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
138 Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 722-23.
140 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
141 Id. at 316 (citations omitted).
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on the “quality and nature”142 of the contacts with the state.  The Court stated
that “casual” or “isolated” contacts in a state will not suffice to authorize juris-
diction, but “systematic and continuous” contacts with the state will authorize
the state’s jurisdiction.143
Not surprisingly, the “minimum contacts” standard set out in International
Shoe has been modernized.144  The Supreme Court has concluded that there
must be some act by which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within” the state that is trying to exercise its
jurisdictional control.145  Thus, a defendant that conducts activities in a state
invokes the benefits and protections of that state’s laws and, likewise, is subject
to those laws.146  However, the mere introduction of a product into the stream
of commerce does not establish sufficient contact to establish jurisdiction in
that state.147  Contacts with the eventual state must be foreseeable in order for a
defendant to be under that state’s jurisdiction.148
The Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner extended International Shoe’s
“minimum contacts” standard to also apply to in rem jurisdiction.149  There-
fore, “as the law stands on state court jurisdiction, the requirement of ‘pres-
ence’ is seen through the proverbial lens of ‘minimum contacts’ for both in rem
and in personam actions.”150 Shaffer also stated that courts generally cannot
exercise in rem jurisdiction unless the Due Process Clause would have permit-
ted in personam jurisdiction.151
Applying the International Shoe standard and its progeny to the context of
the Internet, the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.152 established a
sliding-scale test for determining whether a website has purposefully availed
itself of a specific state’s jurisdiction.  In Zippo Manufacturing, Zippo Manu-
facturing brought suit in federal court in Pennsylvania against Zippo Dot Com
for violating a trademark.153  Zippo Manufacturing claimed that Zippo Dot
Com’s use of its registered domain names—zippo.com, zippo.net, and zippo
news.com—infringed on its “Zippo” trademark.154
The Court held that the “likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be con-
stitutionally exercised is directly proportionate[, on a sliding-scale basis,] to the
142 Id. at 319.
143 Id. at 317 (citations omitted).
144 Kentucky Case District Court Opinion, supra note 8, at 17.
145 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
146 Id.
147 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (citations
omitted).
148 Id. at 297.
149 433 U.S. 186, 205 (1977).
150 Kentucky Case District Court Opinion, supra note 8, at 18.
151 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (“Although in rem proceedings purport to
affect nothing more than the disposition of property, they necessarily affect the interests of
persons as well.”).
152 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
153 Id. at 1121.
154 Id.
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nature and quality of commercial activity” conducted on the Internet.155  On
one end of the scale a defendant clearly conducted business over the Internet,
such as forming contracts or making sales.156  On the other end of the scale a
defendant is “passively” present on the Internet.157  “A passive [website] that
does little more than make information available to those who are interested in
it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”158  Applying the new
sliding-scale test, the court in Zippo Manufacturing held that Zippo Dot Com’s
websites were highly active159—contracting with over 3,000 individuals in
Pennsylvania—and thus purposefully availing themselves of the privilege of
doing business in Pennsylvania.160  Therefore, Zippo Dot Com was subject to
personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.
Adding to Zippo Manufacturing’s sliding-scale test, the Fourth Circuit
effectuated its own application of personal jurisdiction over Internet-based con-
tacts in ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc.161  In ALS Scan, an
owner of copyrighted photographs brought suit in federal district court in the
District of Maryland against an Internet Service Provider (ISP) based in Geor-
gia.  The issue was whether the defendant infringed on copyrighted material by
enabling a website owner to publish photographs on its website.162
The court held that the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, having the same jurisdictional reach as the state of Maryland, did not
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.163  The court stated that a state
may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into
the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions
within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential
cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts.164
The Court concluded that the defendant ISP’s activity on the Internet was,
at most, passive.165  Accordingly, even though electronic information passed
between the defendant and Maryland, the defendant was not subject to the
Maryland courts.  The court further reasoned that personal jurisdiction reach
may only be based on “an out-of-state person’s Internet activity directed at [the
respective state] and causing injury that gives rise to a potential claim cogniza-
ble in [that state].”166
The Minnesota Court of Appeals applied the personal jurisdiction stan-
dards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny, in Humphrey v. Granite
Gate Resorts, Inc.167 The court concluded that a company operating an
155 Id. at 1124.
156 Id. (citations omitted).
157 Id.
158 Id. (citations omitted).
159 Id. at 1125-26.
160 Id. at 1121-22, 1126.
161 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).
162 Id. at 709.
163 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
164 ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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Internet website that advertised a new on-line wagering site was subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Minnesota “because, through [its] Internet activities, [it]
purposefully availed [itself] of the privilege of doing business in Minnesota to
the extent that maintenance of an action . . . does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.”168
In Granite Gate Resorts, the defendant was a Nevada corporation that
operated a tourist information website.169  The defendant advertised on the
tourist website for its new on-line wagering service website that was soon to be
available.170  The advertisement stated that the on-line wagering service “will
provide sports fans with a legal way to bet [online].”171  The website invited
Internet users to add themselves to a mailing list to receive more information
regarding the new on-line wagering site and provided a toll-free number to get
more information.172  Subsequently, the Minnesota Attorney General brought
suit alleging “deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud
by advertising in Minnesota that gambling on the Internet is lawful.”173  The
district court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion,174 and on appeal the Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the district
court’s holding.175
Zippo Manufacturing, ALS Scan, and Granite Gate Resorts are highly dis-
tinguishable from the Kentucky Case in that the former cases held that the
respective state had jurisdiction over the domain name owner or defendant
website operator,176 whereas in the Kentucky Case the state claims it has juris-
diction over the domain name registrars—the third party companies that have
the authority to register the rights to domain names to other companies or indi-
viduals.  Thus, the difficult jurisdictional issue posed to Kentucky is not
whether the courts have jurisdiction over the domain name or their respective
owners, but whether the state’s courts have jurisdiction over the domain name
registrars.  In the Kentucky Case, the business that the domain name registrars
conducted in Kentucky by way of the Internet, if any, is the sale of domain
names to website operators.  These acts or “contacts” with Kentucky necessa-
rily do not give rise to a violation of Kentucky’s gambling laws.
For purposes of in rem jurisdiction, domain name registrars do not own
the domain names that they register; rather, they merely have the authority to
sell the rights to the domain names for specified time periods.  Hence, the Ken-
tucky courts necessarily do not have in rem jurisdiction over the registrars since
168 Id. at 721.
169 Id. at 717.
170 Id.
171 Id. (emphasis added).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 718.
175 Id. at 717.  The Court of Appeals of Minnesota reasoned that five factors must be con-
sidered in determining that a defendant established “minimum contacts” with the forum state
to warrant the state’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  The five factors are (1) the
quantity of the defendant’s contacts, (2) the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts,
(3) the connection between the cause of action and the defendant’s contacts, (4) the state’s
interest in providing the forum, and (5) the convenience of the parties. Id. at 718.
176 Id. at 721.
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no property interest ever existed.  Moreover, under Shaffer, Kentucky would
have to prove it had in personam jurisdiction over the registrars before it could
exercise its in rem jurisdiction.  In addition to the court’s lack of in rem juris-
diction, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 indemnifies any domain
name registrar from being liable for the criminal acts of its registrant custom-
ers.177  In effect, the Act preempts any state law that seeks to hold a registrar
liable, or even named as a defendant or codefendant, for its registrant’s alleged
criminal activities.
It is arguable that the domain name registrars at issue in the Kentucky
Case have made some sort of “minimum contacts” with the state of Kentucky.
However, mere introduction of a product into the stream of commerce—selling
the rights to domain names from the registrar’s own website—does not estab-
lish sufficient contact to establish jurisdiction.  The registrars’ contacts with the
eventual state must be “foreseeable” for Kentucky to have jurisdiction.  Moreo-
ver, Kentucky’s claim over the domain name registrars must arise out of the
registrars’ actions or contacts with the state.
Even acceding that the Kentucky courts do have jurisdiction over the 141
domain name owners,178 the courts do not have jurisdiction over the domain
name registrars.  Kentucky’s claim for personal jurisdiction is nebulous in that
it does not evince that the registrars’ contacts with the state are “foreseeable.”
In fact, the district court in Kentucky “never opined on any minimum contacts
with the registrars themselves, the entities who received the court’s Order to
transfer the domain names,”179 not to mention the foreseeability of the contacts.
The foreseeability that is required to establish a state court’s jurisdiction
“is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”180
The availability and accessibility of the Internet is ubiquitous.  A particular
website, regardless of the location of its registrar or owner, is readily available
to anyone worldwide who has an Internet connection.  Likewise, a domain
name registrar’s website, where it sells the rights to domain names, can be
accessed—and the rights to a domain name purchased—by anyone anywhere
in the world.  That being said, the registrars did not purposefully avail them-
selves of any and all jurisdictions with residents that have Internet access.
Rather, the registrars only availed themselves of the indiscernible jurisdiction
of the Internet.  As pervasive as the Internet is, it is not foreseeable.  It is
unconscionable that domain name registrars can be subject to jurisdiction wher-
ever the Internet is available.  Permitting such an all-encompassing jurisdiction
is a violation of due process.  Likewise, it is even less foreseeable that registrars
177 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another informa-
tion content provider.”). See also Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684,
693 (2001).
178 This Note does not address the legal issues regarding whether the Kentucky courts have
jurisdiction over the 141 Domain Names or their owners.
179 Brief for The Elec. Frontier Found., et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 13,
Vicsbingo.com and Interactive Gaming Council v. Kentucky No. 2008-CA-2036, (Ky. Ct.
App. Nov. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Kentucky Case Appeals Court Amicus Brief].
180 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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will vicariously be subject to the jurisdictions of which its domain name regis-
trants181 have purposefully availed themselves.
Furthermore, in order for Kentucky to have jurisdiction, the state’s legisla-
ture “must affirmatively grant that authority.”182  Kentucky’s long-arm statute
does not permit the state to exercise jurisdiction to the extent that the United
States Constitution permits jurisdiction under the Due Process clause.  Rather,
it only permits its courts to assert jurisdiction over a person or his or her agent
as to “claim[s] arising from the person’s . . . [t]ransacting any business” in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky.183
The plain language of Kentucky’s long-arm statute only allows a claim to
be brought against the person transacting the business.  In the Kentucky Case,
the only persons conducting business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky that
the claim is based on are the domain names and their owners, not their respec-
tive registrars.  Consequently, the long-arm statute prohibits Kentucky from
bringing a cause of action against the domain name registrars.  It is reasonable
to conclude that the Kentucky long-arm statute reaches both Internet gambling
domain names and their owners that directly or indirectly conduct business in
the state.  However, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Kentucky’s long-arm statute limit Kentucky’s personal jurisdiction reach.
Therefore, absent the fact that any domain name registrar transacts any business
in Kentucky in relation to the Kentucky Case claim, it is unreasonable that
Kentucky’s long-arm statute reaches domain name registrars.
B. The Commerce Clause and its Kicker, the Dormant Commerce Clause
Among the enumerated powers given to Congress, the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution states that Congress shall have the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . .”184
In addition, the Supremacy Clause provides that “when a state law conflicts
with a federal law enacted by Congress pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power, the federal law stands and the state law falls.”185
The Commerce Clause prohibits individual States from regulating
“[c]ommerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States[.]”186  Thus,
“Congress has exclusive domain over those aspects of interstate commerce that
are so national in character to demand uniform treatment.”187  Since Gibbons v.
181 See WEBOPEDIA.COM, supra note 25.
182 Kentucky Case Appeals Court Amicus Brief, supra note 179, at 14 (citing Davis H.
Elliot Co. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., 513 F.2d 1176, 1179 (6th Cir. 1975)).
183 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(a)(1) (West 2002).
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
185 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Kristen Adams, Comment, Interstate Gambling—Can States
Stop the Run for the Border?, 44 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1037 (1995) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (2d ed. 1983)).
186 Brief for The Elec. Frontier Found., et al. as Amici Curiae Opposing Appellants at 5-6,
Kentucky v. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc. No. 2009-SC-000043, (Ky.
Apr. 17, 2009) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
187 H. Joseph Hameline & William Miles, The Dormant Commerce Clause Meets the
Internet, 41 B.B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 8, 9.
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Ogden,188 the Supreme Court has recognized Congress’ implied power to strike
down state and federal regulations interfering with interstate commerce.189
In order for the Commerce Clause to apply, “interstate commerce” must
be at issue.  A state statute that prohibits online gambling in its state is broad
enough to hinder online gambling by citizens of other states;190 thus, the law
affects “interstate” commerce.  The statute would also permit prosecution of
out-of-state defendants.191  The nature of the Internet does not allow an Internet
gambling website, without undue costs, to disallow access to certain states.192
Finally, the Internet—often referred to as the “information superhighway” that
transports digitized goods—is analogous to highways and railroads;193 there-
fore, the Internet, and subsequently online gambling, is an instrumentality in
interstate commerce.
Congress has legislated as to the regulation of Internet gambling through
the UIGEA.194  The federal statute did not give the states supreme authority to
regulate Internet gambling.195  Accordingly, the Commerce Clause is effective
in that the UIGEA is a federal statute that regulates Internet gambling, showing
that Congress views Internet gambling as national and “interstate” in nature,
and thus state laws affecting Internet gambling are preempted.
Moreover, “[i]n areas of the law in which Congress has not exercised its
Commerce Clause power, its ‘Dormant Commerce Clause’ power acts as a bar-
rier” to a state’s acts that affect other states and even other countries.196  The
Dormant Commerce Clause is relevant to the Kentucky Case in that, even if the
UIGEA does not specifically trump a state’s gambling laws, regulation of the
Internet—and thus Internet gambling—is national in scope; therefore, it is
reserved to the federal government, not the states.  Specifically, Dormant Com-
merce Clause issues arise when “Congress has not spoken clearly on a particu-
lar issue.  This is the case with Internet gambling.”197  Because some states will
opt to legalize Internet gambling and some will prohibit it, regulation of
Internet gambling will be inconsistent in the common market and thus would
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.198
188 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
189 Brief for Appellee Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc. at 44, Brown v.
Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc., No. 2009-SC-000043 (Ky. May 27, 2009)
(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
190 Olson, supra note 12, at para. 32 (citing Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
191 Id. at para. 30.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 31 U.S.C. § 5361-5367 (2006).  For the pertinent text of the statute, see supra Part III.B.
In addition, the Wire Act of 1961 arguably may effectuate the Commerce Clause regarding
Internet gambling.
195 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361(b), 5262(10)(D)(ii) (2006).  “[N]either extending nor preempting
state laws.”
196 Adams, supra note 185, at 1037.  The Clause is referred to as the “Dormant Commerce
Clause” because states are prohibited from enacting regulations even if Congress has not
acted if the regulation discriminates against commerce or unduly burdens interstate com-
merce.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 401 (1994).
197 Kailus, supra note 93, at 1075-76.
198 Id. at 1076.
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Had the trial court’s order in the Kentucky Case prevailed, Kentucky
would be authorized to seize from domain name registrars any Internet website
deemed to violate Kentucky law.199  Moreover, the state would be able to
impose its laws on the other forty-nine states and even on “the rest of the
world.”200  By authorizing the seizure of domain names, the state of Kentucky
is essentially attempting to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.201  Ken-
tucky’s law not only imposes on other states, but it fails to even attempt to meet
the requirement that states pursue their legitimate interests “by means imposing
the least restrictive effects on interstate commerce.”202
The prominent case addressing a state’s regulation of the Internet and its
violation of the Commerce Clause is American Libraries Association v.
Pataki.203  In Pataki, a New York law made it unlawful to use a computer
communications system to transfer sexually explicit material to minors.204  The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
New York statute was unconstitutional for violating the Commerce Clause.205
The court concluded that the New York law is an “unconstitutional projection
of New York law into conduct that occurs outside New York” and that “the
burdens on interstate commerce resulting from the Act clearly exceed[ed] any
local benefit derived from it.”206
Central to the court’s decision was the perception that the Internet is “one
of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to
protect users from inconsistent” regulation across the states that can “paralyze
development of the Internet altogether.”207  The display of web pages and the
flow of finances cannot reasonably be limited to citizens of one particular state
or made unavailable to citizens of one particular state, so the Internet is indeed
national in scope.208  Inconsistent regulations “would prevent the establishment
of an Internet gambling business in a state where such activity might be
legal. . . . Such a prohibition resulting from inconsistent state laws is the precise
result which the [D]ormant Commerce Clause is designed to prevent.”209
The Kentucky statute that outlaws Internet gambling violates the Com-
merce Clause for the same reasons laid out in Pataki.  First, the Kentucky law
affects conduct occurring outside of Kentucky.  By seizing a domain name of
an Internet gambling site, Kentucky will shut down access of those sites to
citizens outside of Kentucky, such as someone in Las Vegas, Nevada or even
199 Kentucky Case Appeals Court Amicus Brief, supra note 179, at 10.
200 Id. at 10-11.  As Professor Tribe notes, the Supreme Court has stated that “a state law is
invalid per se under the Commerce Clause if it ‘has the “practical effect” of regulating
commerce occurring wholly outside that State’s borders.’” LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031 (2000) (quoting Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 332
(1989)).
201 Kentucky Case Appeals Court Amicus Brief, supra note 179, at 11.
202 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 350 (7th ed. 2004).
203 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
204 Id. at 163-64.
205 Id. at 183-84.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 171.
209 Olson, supra note 12, at para. 39.
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London, England trying to gamble online.  Moreover, out-of-state businesses
will be subject to the risk that a person in Kentucky accesses its gambling
website, thereby making the business vulnerable to prosecution in Kentucky.210
Therefore, Kentucky’s law prohibiting Internet gambling is “an imposition of
its law on the businesses [and citizens] in other states where Internet gambling
may be legal.”211
Second, the burdens that the Kentucky statute places on interstate com-
merce clearly exceed the benefits derived from it.  As previously stated, the
Kentucky statute was implemented to gain more control over its local gambling
operations in an effort to generate more tax revenue for the state.  However, the
burden imposed on the rest of the forty-nine states and the world at large—
preventing citizens of states that have legalized internet gambling or requiring a
website to prohibit citizens of the states in which Internet gambling is prohib-
ited—far exceeds the benefit Kentucky will derive from the additional tax reve-
nue.  “A government that is obligated to let in goods and services of other
jurisdictions must let in outside legal gambling, unless it can show that the
exclusion is to protect its residents.  Laws that merely protect the local gam-
bling operations from outside competition are invalid.”212
“Regulation by any single state can only result in chaos.”213  Internet
gambling is a function of the Internet, and must be left to federal regulation to
prevent inconsistent regulations across the states.  It can be argued that gam-
bling has historically been regulated by the states, and thus Internet gambling is
not necessarily national in scope.  However, the Internet has been deemed the
contrary—national in scope.  Online gambling’s very existence relies on the
boundary-less nature of the Internet and thus should only be regulated at the
federal level.
V. STATES LACK AUTHORITY TO SEIZE INTERNET GAMBLING
WEBSITES’ DOMAIN NAMES
States lack the necessary authority to seize an Internet gambling website’s
domain name from their respective domain name registrar.  Although Internet
gambling is considered mainstream today, it is a rather new form of gambling,
and accordingly, legislatures and courts have been indecisive on how to treat it.
Moreover, the Internet in general is still considered young and is continuously
changing, making it a challenging area for regulation.  Accordingly, the
Internet is such a pervasive domain that regulation, if not drafted diligently,
will be largely, if not absolutely, ineffective.
For the most part, Congress has made a conscientious effort to hold back
from regulating the Internet.  “[T]he Internet’s growth and success as a tool for
expanded commerce and the free flow of ideas can be attributed in large part to
[Congress’] relative resistance thus far to erect government mandated road-
210 Id. at para. 33.
211 Id.
212 ROSE & OWENS, supra note 22, at 247.
213 Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 181 (emphasis added).
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blocks.”214  Despite Congress’ effort up to this point to leave the Internet rela-
tively free from regulation, the Internet still has a long way to go before it
reaches its full potential, and government regulation now would cripple that
vast potential.215
Congress should take the same approach regarding Internet gambling.
Although the federal government historically has left gambling up to the
respective states to regulate,216 state regulation should not be the case for
Internet gambling.  There is a much more prevalent factor: the nature of the
Internet.  A state does not have the authority to seize an Internet gambling
website’s domain name from its respective domain name registrar for allegedly
violating that state’s laws because the state necessarily lacks personal jurisdic-
tion and violates the Commerce Clause.
Kentucky lacks personal jurisdiction over the domain name registrars.217
First and foremost, the federal Communications Decency Act preempts Ken-
tucky’s gambling laws from having effect on and jurisdiction over domain
name registrars.218  That is, the Act indemnifies a domain name registrar from
being held liable or accountable, or even named as a party to the action, for the
alleged criminal activities of its registrants.
Additionally, in order to be in violation of Kentucky’s gambling laws,
domain names must fall within the statutory definition of “gambling device”
and must also be construed as property for the purposes of in rem jurisdiction.
Domain names do not fall within Kentucky’s gambling law’s definition of
“gambling device.”219  Looking at the plain language of the statute as a whole,
it is evident that Kentucky’s legislature intended for the statute, describing a
gambling device that was “designed or manufactured,” to cover only physical,
tangible gambling devices.  Accordingly, the courts of Kentucky must not
expand the definition of “gambling device,” for it is the legislature’s responsi-
bility to define “gambling device” as being either physical or nonphysical, or
both, so that it includes domain names.
214 Press Release, Jeffrey Mazzella, President, Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Congress Must
Not Steer Regulation of the Internet (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legislative_
issues/federal_issues/hot_issues_in_congress/technology/CFIF_Warns_Congress_Against_
Net_Neutrality_Legislation.htm.
215 Id.
216 Olson, supra note 12, para. 3; 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(1) (2006).
217 As stated previously, this Note does not address whether Kentucky has personal jurisdic-
tion over the domain names and their owners.
218 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).  Congress declared that
It is the policy of the United States
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other
interactive computer services; [and]
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material;
219 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 528.010(4)(a)-(b) (West 1994).
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Based on the function and purpose of a registrar, it is clear that domain
names are not property.  Registrars are in the business of selling only the rights
to the domain name to a website operator; they are not selling the domain
names themselves.  Regardless of whether Kentucky even has jurisdiction over
the domain names and their owners, it is not foreseeable to a domain name
registrar that he would be subject to a state’s jurisdiction for its registrant’s
activities.  Because the Internet is a domain that stretches across the fifty states
and the entire globe, it would be unconscionable for any court to hold that
domain name registrars could foresee being hailed into essentially any and
every state or country’s courts.
Kentucky’s gambling laws, when applied to Internet gambling, violate the
Commerce Clause.  The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
prohibits a state from regulating commerce among the states.220  The Clause
gives Congress the exclusive sovereignty over interstate commerce that is so
national, or even international, in character to demand uniform treatment.
In the Kentucky Case, the interstate commerce at issue is Internet gam-
bling.  Internet gambling is considered a piece of interstate commerce because
a state statute that prohibits online gambling affects Internet gambling—its cost
and availability—for citizens of other states and other countries.  In addition to
affecting out-of-state gamblers, an anti-Internet gambling law in Kentucky also
permits prosecution of out-of-state Internet gambling website operators.  Both
the Wire Act of 1961 and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006, inter alia,221 cover the regulation of Internet gambling at the federal
level.  These federal laws show Congress’ intent to regulate Internet gambling
at the federal level, thus prohibiting states from enacting their own Internet
gambling prohibition laws.
In the event that the Wire Act and the UIGEA are found not to give Con-
gress the exclusive authority to regulate Internet gambling, the Dormant Com-
merce Clause steps in and retains regulation at the federal level.  Theoretically,
the Dormant Commerce Clause reserves regulatory power to the federal gov-
ernment of any commerce so national in scope that if anyone is going to regu-
late it, the federal government will.  To prevent the hindrance of the
development of the Internet, regulation of it shall be reserved to Congress, as
the Internet is an area of commerce that must be protected from inconsistent
regulation across the states.
If the Kentucky anti-Internet gambling laws were held to not violate the
Commerce Clause, the Kentucky courts would effectively shut down access to
the 141 domain names to anyone worldwide, would subject any Internet gam-
bling website to prosecution in Kentucky, and would impose Kentucky’s
Internet gambling laws on citizens and businesses of states where gambling is
lawful.  The burdens of Kentucky’s gambling laws on interstate commerce far
exceed their benefits; that is, the burden placed on the citizens of the rest of the
forty-nine states and the rest of the world—preventing access to an activity in a
state in which it is lawful or requiring a website to block a certain geographic
220 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Kentucky Case Appeals Court Amicus Brief,
supra note 179, at 11.
221 For additional federal statutes regarding Internet gambling, see list in infra, Part III.
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area, if at all possible, from accessing the website—far exceeds Kentucky’s
additional tax revenue benefit.  Thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause gives
Congress, not the states, the exclusive authority to regulate Internet gambling.
Accordingly, Kentucky’s anti-Internet gambling laws violate the Commerce
Clause.
In analyzing the Kentucky Case, a state does not have the authority to
seize an Internet gambling website’s domain name from their respective regis-
trar for violating that state’s laws.  Regulation by individual states will only
result in “chaos.”  The unique dynamics of the Internet and Internet gambling
require that any regulation must be uniform across the states, and so must take
place at the federal level.
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